Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts: Experimental Evidence by Lefebvre, Mathieu & Vieider, Ferdinand M.
Mathieu Lefebvre und Ferdinand M. Vieider:
Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive
Contracts: Experimental Evidence
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2011-7
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12210/
Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts: 
Experimental Evidence
Mathieu Lefebvre
University of Liège, CREPP; Boulevard du Rectorat, 7 Bâtiment 31, boîte 39, 4000 Liège, Belgium. 
E-mail: mathieu.lefebvre@ulg.ac.be
and
 Ferdinand M. Vieider#
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, Munich, Germany.  
Email: fvieider@gmail.com
08 April 2011
Abstract
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares 
to induce risk neutrality in otherwise risk averse agents. In an experiment, we find that subjects 
acting as executives do also take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders if 
compensated through options. Compensation through restricted company stock reduces the uptake 
of excessive risks. Even under stock-ownership, however, experimental executives continue to take 
excessive risks—a result that cannot be accounted for by classic incentive theory. We develop a 
basic model in which such risk-taking behavior is explained based on a richer array of risk attitudes 
derived from Prospect Theory. We use the model to derive hypotheses on what may be driving 
excessive risk taking in the experiment. Testing those hypotheses, we find that most of them are 
indeed borne out by the data. We thus conclude that a prospect-theory-based model is more apt at 
explaining risk attitudes under different compensation regimes than traditional principal-agent  
models grounded in expected utility theory. 
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1. Introduction
A large part of the performance-contingent pay of executives today is delivered through stock-
options. Traditionally, the compensation of executives through stock-options instead of company 
shares has been justified by the need of inducing some desirable risk appetite in otherwise risk-
averse agents (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1987; Smith & Stulz, 1985). This argument however rests on 
the assumption of global risk aversion by executives (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). A wealth of 
evidence from the empirical literature points in the direction that risk attitudes depend on decision  
frames and aspiration levels as well as the source of the uncertainty, and may thus vary over the 
outcome and probability spaces (Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, & Wakker, 2010; Diecidue & van de 
Ven, 2008; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). We develop a simple model relaxing the assumption of 
global risk aversion. Assuming a richer array of risk attitudes based on prospect theory (Kahnemann 
& Tversky, 1979), we predict that some risk seeking may take place under stock compensation as 
well as under compensation through options. And this holds even when such risk taking is excessive 
from shareholders' point of view.
 The long-standing postulate that linear incentive contracts result in risk aversion on the side 
of agents lacks empirical evidence. The availability of data on these issues is indeed limited, and 
often no clear-cut, causal conclusions can be drawn even where such data can be found. We thus 
investigate the effect of different compensation mechanisms experimentally. Experiments have the  
advantage of permitting controlled variations in one independent variable at the time, thus 
permitting the isolation of clear causal relationships. Experiments are common in finance for issues 
that are difficult to disentangle in the real world (e.g. Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, & Pouget, 2005; 
Gneezy, Kapteyn, & Potters, 2003; Haigh & List, 2005), and can significantly supplement results 
obtained from the analysis of real-world data. Furthermore, experimental investigation makes 
simplifications aimed at isolating fundamental causal relationship which closely resemble the  
simplifications made by theoretical models—and few people doubt the usefulness of theories 
because of the simplifications they entail.
We let experimental executives choose between two prospects into which to invest company 
assets, characterized by different volatility levels. In order to test the extent to which compensation 
through options may induce risk taking, the high volatility investment is also always inferior in 
terms of expected value, although to different degrees. Our results indicate that option-based 
compensation schemes can induce risk taking by executives that is excessive from shareholders' 
point of view. More importantly, even linear compensation through long-term stock-ownership 
plans results in high levels of suboptimal risk taking.
Classical accounts based on expected utility theory cannot explain such risk taking under 
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linear incentive contracts. We thus find that executives' behavior is described much better by a 
prospect-theory-based model. In general, a majority of our experimental subjects exhibit prospect-
theory-type risk preferences. Reference-point effects and overweighting of small probabilities are 
found to make executives take risks even when compensated through restricted company stock. 
When compensation takes the form of stock options, executives tend to take excessive risks 
especially when they hold options that are at- or out-of-the-money—a finding that cannot be 
explained by classical expected utility models. We thus argue that expanding incentive theory to 
allow for richer risk-attitudes as found in empirical investigations promises to greatly increase our 
understanding of the issues involved.
The present paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of different 
compensation schemes and develops a simple model predicting choices based on expected utility 
theory. Section 3 presents the experiment and its main results. Section 4 expands the model 
developed in section 2 to take account of prospect-theory-type behavior, and tests the predictions 
thus derived on the data. Section 5 contains a general discussion of our findings, and section 6 
concludes the paper.
2. Compensation schemes and investment behavior
2.1 Stock option compensation versus stock ownership
The importance of stock-option payments has increased dramatically over the last two decades and 
holds a prominent place in the overall compensation of executives (Core et al. 2003; Hall & 
Liebman, 1998). Traditionally, compensation through stock options has been explained as a solution 
to the agency problem inasmuch as it counteracts the natural risk aversion of executives (Agrawal 
& Mandelker, 1987; Feltham & Wu, 2001; Guay, 1999; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Smith & Stulz, 
1985). Indeed, options shelter executives from potential losses since they do not have to be 
exercised in case of a decline in stock prices (Bebchuck & Fried, 2003; De Fusco, Johnson, & Zorn, 
1990). The result that stock options may increase risk seeking when the latter is desirable is thus 
well established. It is less clear what will happen when any risk seeking is undesirable. We thus 
want to test the extent to which compensation through options can induce the uptake of risks that 
are sub-optimal for the company.
 It is also generally accepted that paying executives in restricted company stock increases 
the linearity of the incentive instrument (Holden, 2005; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Traditionally, this 
has mostly been seen as undesirable, since it may trigger excessive risk aversion on the side of 
executives. There is however a lack of empirical evidence on this point, and the conclusion holds 
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true only as long as one assumes that executives maximize expected utility theory with a concave 
utility function, i.e. they are risk averse over the whole outcome space. Expected utility theory has 
however been shown time and again to have significant shortcomings as a descriptive theory of 
choice behavior (Starmer, 2000). Indeed, people's risk attitudes have been found to vary widely over 
the probability and outcome space—a finding that has also been shown to hold for large firms 
(Chou, Chou, & Ko, 2009; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988) and for actual CEOs (List & Mason, 
2010). Once one relaxes the assumption that executives are risk averse expected utility maximizers,  
it is no longer clear how much risk they will take when compensated through stock.
Arguably, a dimension that may be just as important as the fact whether executives are 
compensated through stock options or actual company stock is the time-horizon of the 
compensation scheme. In the present experiment, we compare stock-options with short vesting 
periods to long-term stock-ownership plans. This choice is driven by the aim of subjecting the 
hypothesis that there may be excessive risk taking even under stock compensation to as hard a test 
as possible: While it may sometimes be appealing to take a long shot if shares can be sold after each 
investment period, risk taking becomes clearly sub-optimal in our setting when such equity can be 
cashed only after multiple periods.
2.2 A simple model and some initial hypotheses
In this section we develop a model aimed at generating hypotheses for our empirical investigation.  
Though it easily generalizes to a wider class of compensation schemes, we will adopt the 
terminology of our experimental investigation to simplify exposition. Executives choose between 
investing into a low volatility (LV) investment project or a high volatility investment (HV) project. 
The expected value (EV) of the high volatility investment opportunity is always inferior to the one 
of the low volatility investment by design (EVHV<EVLV), since we want to test the conditions under 
which risk taking by executives may be excessive. As implicit in the designation, the standard 
deviation of the high volatility investment is always larger than the one of the low volatility  
investment: σHV > σLV .
In each period, the CEO has to make a choice between two investments. Such choices are 
repeated for T periods. CEOs are compensated either through stock-options or company shares. 
Under stock ownership, the executive is compensated through shares in the firm she manages that 
are not tradable until the end of the contract, T. Under a stock-options contract, the executive 
receives, each period, a grant of stock-options that become vested in the subsequent period, so that 
they can be exercised in any period until the end of the contract at T. These stock-options are 
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emitted at-the-money at the exercise price et =yt., where yt represents the value of shares at the time t 
when the options are emitted. For simplicity we will assume that whenever an option is exercised, 
the shares thus called will be resold immediately, so that realized gains for options emitted at time t 
and sold at time i will be yi–et,  y > e and i > t.
We assume that CEOs maximize their own payoff, and first solve the problem for an 
expected value maximizer (defined as an individual who maximizes the mathematical expectation  
of the payoff). For CEOs compensated through company stock the problem is trivial: since the 
expected value of the LV investment is always higher than for the HV investment, it is optimal to  
always choose the LV investment. When on the other hand a CEO is compensated through options, 
then her compensation varies linearly with the firm’s share price only to the extent that the share 
price exceeds the exercise price. Hence the manager’s payoff from an option emitted at time t is 
maxi{ yi–et , 0}. Since the manager receives a grant of options in each period until T–1 , the CEO 
now chooses his investments so as to maximize the following expression:
(1)
Feltham and Wu (2001) showed that the value of an option increases monotonically with stock price 
variance. Under risk neutrality, it is thus easy to see that when compensated through stock options, 
the CEO will always prefer the riskier investment as long as the two investments have equal 
expected value. Smith and Stulz (1985) also showed that stock-options may induce risk-averse 
managers to choose investments with higher volatility. It is however far from clear that this result  
will carry over to our case, where the investment with a higher volatility is also inferior in terms of 
expected value. Indeed, Ross (2004) showed that this may not hold for a risk-averse executive. We 
have already seen that under stock compensation risk neutral executives will never take the HV 
investment since it is inferior in terms of expected value. Given that it also holds the higher risk, as 
measured by its volatility, this must be even more true under the assumption of risk aversion under 
expected utility theory. We thus derive the following hypothesis:
H1: Executives compensated through company stock will never take the high volatility 
investment.
While executives compensated through options are predicted to be more risk seeking, it is not quite 
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clear to what extent this result will hold when the high volatility investment is inferior in terms of  
expected value:
H2: When compensated through options, executives will invest into the HV investment at 
least in some cases; this also means that a) executives take more risks when compensated 
through options than when compensated through stock; and b) the extent of risk taking under 
option compensation will decrease in the expected value difference between the two 
investments.
3. The Experiment
3.1 Experimental Design 
Subjects. 96 subjects were recruited from a list of experimental subjects maintained at GATE, 
University of Lyon, France, using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Groups of six subjects 
needed to be formed, so that all sessions were run with either 12 or 18 subjects each. Subjects had 
an average age of 22 years, and 55% of subjects were female. 63% were studying economics or 
business management, 31% mathematics or engineering and the rest is not specified. 
Main Task. In the main part of the experiment, groups of six subjects are formed. The composition 
of the groups is kept fixed for the 15 periods, and subjects do not know whom they are matched 
with. At the outset of the experiment, each group member is assigned the role of CEO of one 
company. In their function of CEO of a company, subjects are confronted with a sequence of 
investment decisions over 15 periods. In each period, the CEO decides between two investment 
opportunities into which to invest the total stock of company assets (screenshots in appendix A). 
The initial stock value of the company is €100 ($150) for everyone. The final value of the company 
will be determined by the outcome of the 15 investment decisions1. At the same time, each group 
member also acts as shareholder in the five other companies managed by the five other subjects in 
her group. The shareholder role is a passive role, in the sense that it does not require any action on 
the part for the subject. However, it contributes towards final payoffs in the following way. Each 
subject is given one share with the initial value of €1 ($1.50) in each of the other five companies in 
her group. She is then paid the final value of that share (total company value divided by100) at the 
end of the 15 periods. Each CEO observes only the performance of her own company for the 15 
1Please note that any change in share prices in our experimental model are generated purely by changes in the  
underlying value of the company assets as determined by investment outcomes—there is no market for shares.
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periods of the experiment. The experiment was conducted using the REGATE software (Zeiliger, 
2000).
Investment Decisions. In each period, the CEO has to choose between two investment opportunities 
in which to invest total company assets. The investment opportunities (prospects) are described in 
terms of percentage increases or decreases of the company’s value. Investments are displayed 
graphically by means of pie-charts representing the probabilities of winning and losing in addition 
to a verbal description. The choice is always between a high volatility (HV) and a low volatility 
(LV) prospect. The LV prospect always offers a higher expected value than the HV prospect, so that 
any risk taking observed is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders by 
definition, inasmuch as it delivers a lower expected value. Indeed, differences in expected value 
were such that consistently investing in the LV option would yield an expected final company value 
that was almost 30 percentage points higher than the one obtainable by consistently investing into 
the HV option. In the initial instructions, subjects were given a graphical overview of the general 
characteristics of the two investments as well as an example representing a choice between two 
'typical investments'. This graphical display, as well as the instructions and a table showing the 
parameters of all prospect pairs can be found in the appendix.
Stock-Option Compensation. The stock-option treatment is our baseline treatment. Each CEO 
obtains five stock-options in each period, which are emitted at-the-money, i.e. giving the right to 
buy company stock at the current stock value. For example, the five options granted before period 1 
investment decisions are made give each the right to buy one share of the company at €1 ($1.50). 
The options get vested in the subsequent period and remain exercisable until the end of the game, so 
that they can be 'cashed' at any time. While in reality the options give right to buy company stock 
which can then be either sold or kept, this decision was unified for simplicity. That is, exercising 
options in the experiment means buying stock and reselling it immediately, thus realizing the 
difference between current stock value and the exercise price of the option. This process seems to 
closely mimic real-world practices of “cashless exercise” (Heath, Huddart, & Lang, 1999). Thus, in 
every period after the first, the CEO is called upon to decide whether to cash her options after the 
results of the investment have become known (separately for options emitted in different periods). 
She will then obtain the new options and decide which investment to take for the subsequent period.
Stock-Ownership Plan. In the stock-ownership condition subjects obtain an initial endowment of 
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10% of the company stock, corresponding to an initial value of €10 ($15). At the end of the 15 
periods, they are paid the final value of their shares. They cannot sell their stock before the end of 
the 15 periods. Their payment structure thus coincides with the one of shareholders, who also obtain 
the value of their shares at the end of the 15 periods. The compensation parameters were designed 
in such a way that the total amount to be earned on average should be roughly equal to the 
compensation in the stock-option condition (see results sections for a discussion).
Risk attitudes. Before the main part of the experiment described above, detailed risk attitudes were 
elicited. A detailed overview of the methodology and results will be given below.
3.2 Risk taking and company performance under alternative compensation regimes
As hypothesized, executives take risks that are excessive from the point of view of shareholders 
when compensated through stock-options. This is also reflected in company performance. Figure 1 
shows the development of mean stock values by compensation type. It can clearly be seen that the 
mean stock value of companies managed by CEOs compensated through stock outperforms 
companies managed by CEOs compensated through stock-options. Indeed, the mean final value of 
companies managed by CEOs compensated through stock is over 10 percentage points higher than 
the mean final value of companies managed by CEOs compensated through options. 
Figure 1: Average stock evolution in the option  (OP) versus stock ownership (ST) treatment over the 15 periods.
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Figure 2 summarizes choice behavior over the 15 investment periods. Subjects choose the inferior 
high volatility investment quite often when compensated through options as predicted by hypothesis 
2 (on average 48.8% of the time). They can also be seen to take significantly less risk on average 
when they hold stock in the company they manage compared to when they are compensated 
through options. Nevertheless, subjects compensated through stock still take significant amounts of 
risk (38.2% of the time on average), thus rejecting the prediction of zero risk taking put forth in 
hypothesis 1. Even from these first descriptive results, we can thus already conclude that hypotheses 
2 is supported by the data, while hypothesis 1 is definitely rejected.
Fig. 2. Average choice of HV investment in the option treatment (OP) and the stock ownership treatment (ST)
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3.3 Regression analysis of overall results: drivers of choice
Table 1 shows the results from a random effects Probit model regressing the choice of the HV 
investment on dummy variables indicating the treatments and a number of other variables. All  
specifications include period dummies as well as demographic variables such as age, gender and 
whether the participant is studying economics or business administration. In specification (1), we 
simply look at the effect of our main treatment variable—whether executives are compensated 
through options or stock. In addition, we include the difference in expected value between the LV 
and the HV investments. In specification (2), we add several measures of two other potentially 
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important drivers of choice—past choices and general company performance. In order to investigate 
the possibility of path dependency or simply the effect of past events, we add the stock-value in the 
previous period as well as the growth rate of the stock value resulting from the last investment. We 
also add information on whether the participant chose a risky investment in the preceding period.
Table 1: Drivers of choice (Random-effects Probit model)
Dep. Variable: choice of the risky 
investment (1) (2)
Stock-ownership –0.382**(0.148)
–0.426**
(0.166)
Difference in expected value –0.302**(0.118)
–0.289**
(0.119)
Previous period stock value –0.034(0.165)
Growth rate –0.008**(0.004)
Choice of risky in previous period –0.321***(0.092)
Gender (male=1) 0.026(0.148)
–0.004
(0.166)
Econ/business studies –0.261*(0.159)
–0.298*
(0.178)
Constant 0.291(0.449)
1.576***
(0.575)
Period effects YES YES
Nb observations 1440(96 subjects)
1344
(96 subjects)
LL –870 –811
Note: *** significant at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
The compensation through stock instead of options significantly reduces risk taking by executives
—an effect that is very stable across all specifications. This confirms hypothesis 2a. The fact that 
differences in expected value (actually: expected stock-value changes) are highly significant 
throughout goes to show that subjects carefully examine the parameters of the investment choices 
when making a decision. It also seems worth mentioning that the effect of the difference in expected 
value appears much more important in the stock-ownership condition than in the option condition. 
Indeed, it is highly significant in the former (p<0.01), while not significant in the latter (p>0.1), thus 
falsifying hypothesis 2b. The coefficient is almost twice as large for stock-owners (χ²=6.78, 
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p=0.033, Chow test). This makes indeed sense if one considers that the aim of maximizing own 
revenue is best achieved through expected value maximization if one is compensated through actual  
stock, while income in the option condition depends on stock-value change rather than expected 
value. It also provides an additional indication that when risk taking occurs in the stock-ownership 
condition it does so mostly for prospect pairs that are close in terms of expected value, and that it is 
thus relatively less harmful to shareholders than the more erratic risk-seeking embarked upon by 
executives compensated through options.
As to the general population variables, there is no main effect of gender or age. Interestingly 
however, field of study has a significant effect. Economics or business management students take 
less risk than the other subjects. In order to understand this finding better, we need to look at the 
effect for different compensation schemes in isolation. We find that economics and business 
students take significantly less risks than other subjects in the stock-ownership conditions (p<0.01). 
When compensated through stock options on the other hand, they take slightly more risks than other 
subjects (ns). This means that in a way they are better at maximizing their own payoff, which is 
linked to stock value in the stock-ownership conditions, but not in the stock-option conditions.
Finally, there remain to be discussed the effects of the growth rate and of a risky choice in 
the previous period. Both positive growth and a risky choice reduce risk seeking by executives. 
Underlying these effects are however complex interaction effects between compensation scheme, 
choice, outcome of the choice, and several other factors such as individual risk attitudes that we 
have not yet introduced. We thus postpone a discussion of those results to a later point, since they 
cannot be explained based on the simple model put forth above.
3.4 Discussion
Options are often hailed as the counterbalancing solution to undesirable risk aversion on the side of 
executives. Such an argument fundamentally relies on an assumption of uniform risk attitudes 
across the probability and outcome spaces. From our simple model developed above, we have seen 
that expected utility theory with concave utility, on which such predictions are usually based,  
predicts zero choices of the high volatility investment under stock compensation. Indeed, given that 
our high volatility investments do always have inferior expected value, even risk neutral executives 
should always choose the low volatility investment—something that at 38% of choices for the high 
volatility investment is clearly contradicted by our data.
This begs the question of what may lie behind such risk taking on the side of executives 
compensated through linear incentive contracts. Expected utility theory could only explain the data  
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assuming that at least 38% of subjects were substantially risk seeking, i.e. displayed a strongly 
convex utility function, and the latter were responsible for all the choices of the HV investments 
(i.e., risk seekers would consistently choose HV and risk averters would consistently choose the LV 
investment). As we will discuss in more detail below, this explanation is not supported by our data. 
Indeed, even subjects who display risk aversion for gains, i.e. a concave utility function under 
expected utility theory, choose the HV investment when compensated through stock about 35% of 
the time. This fundamentally contradicts the hypothesis that all risk seeking in the stock treatment is  
driven by risk seekers in the expected utility sense, thus indicating that expected utility theory 
cannot account for the choices we observe.
A different hypothesis is the one that all choices of the inferior high volatility investment in 
the stock ownership condition are due to error, and thus reflect pure noise. While some choices, 
especially in the initial periods, may indeed be due to noise, such an explanation seems far-fetched 
as a whole. Subjects had to answer detailed questions about the functioning of the game and the 
calculation of their payoffs before the main part of the experiment. Only once they could answer all  
questions correctly were they allowed to participate. Also, subjects obtained feedback about the 
performance of their investment after each period, so that initial errors may be expected to quickly 
disappear.
This leaves us with one more possibility. Modern descriptive theories of decision making 
under risk indicate that risk attitudes are not generally constant, but rather depend on probability 
levels, reference points, or aspiration levels. Indeed, people have been found to be more risk 
seeking when they find themselves below a reference point or aspiration level (Abdellaoui, 2000; 
Diecidue & van de Ven, 2008). Also, non-linear probability weights as predicted by prospect theory 
may distort choices between the high volatility investment—in which the small probability of a  
large gain may be overweighted at the same time as the large probability of a loss is underweighted
—and the low probability investment—in which the medium level probabilities are likely to be 
weighted close to linearity. Fortunately, our data allow us to test for this explanation. We thus 
proceed by expanding our previous model and applying prospect theory to it, thus deriving 
predictions that we can test on the data.
4. Allowing for Richer Risk Attitudes
4.1 Expanding the Model
We adopt a purely behavioral, and hence theory-neutral, definition of risk aversion. An agent is 
defined as risk averse whenever she weakly prefers the expected value of a prospect over the 
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prospect itself. Similarly, she is defined as risk seeking whenever she weakly prefers the prospect 
over its mathematical expectation. Finally, she will be risk neutral if she is both risk averse and risk 
seeking (Wakker, 2010). This definition will allow us to adopt prospect theory as a descriptive 
theory of choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)2. Prospect theory is descriptively superior to 
expected utility theory (Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt, Pinto, & Wakker, 2001), and it is increasingly 
used to explain issues in finance that were previously considered paradoxical (e.g., Bernartzi & 
Thaler, 1995; Fellner & Sutter, 2009; Gneezy & Potters, 1997). It has been found to hold not only 
for students but also for the general population (Booij, van Praag, & van de Kuilen, 2010) and 
influence the behavior of professional traders (Haigh & List, 2005) and executives (List & Mason, 
2010). Furthermore, since prospect theory is more general then expected utility theory, the latter can 
be derived from it as a special case3. Finally, since we have measured our subjects' risk attitudes, we 
can say that a majority of subjects do indeed display the behavioral patterns predicted by prospect 
theory (see below).
One of the most important innovations of prospect theory is reference dependence—the idea 
that the evaluation of a given prospect or outcome depends on a reference point adopted by a 
subject. Reference dependence may give rise to different risk attitudes for gains versus losses as 
well as to loss aversion, a phenomenon by which people attribute more weight to losses than to 
monetarily equivalent gains which is thought to be the strongest component of risk aversion 
(Köbberling & Wakker, 2005). We will designate probability weighting for gains by w+, and 
probability weighting for losses by w–. U(X) is taken to be utility over monetary gains X, and U(–
X)= –λ*U(X) is the utility over monetary losses, where λ is the loss aversion parameter. We will 
also designate gain percentages by α and loss percentages by β, so that for instance a gain in share 
value from a LV investment at time i can be written as αLV*yi.
Let us again start with the simpler case of compensation through company stock. The 
problem is identical for all periods by design, so that we can look at one period in isolation. 
Assuming that the current stock value or status quo acts as a reference point, a CEO will thus 
choose the LV investment whenever
w+(pLV)*U(αLV*yi) –  λ*w–(1–pLV)*U(βLV*yi) > w+(pHV)*U(αHV*yi) –  λ*w–(1–pHV)*U(βHV*yi), (2)
where p represents the probability of a successful investment. This leads us the formulation of the 
following hypothesis:
2 Given that we use only two-outcome prospects, we need not worry about rank dependence for outcomes.
3 This is true in a technical sense, since expected utility theory can be derived from prospect theory by setting the loss 
aversion parameter equal to one and by assuming linear probability weights. From a more general scientific point of 
view this statement is however more problematic, as EUT makes other general assumptions that are incompatible 
with the worldview espoused in the prospect theory paradigm (see Kuhn, 1962, for a general discussion of 
conflicting research paradigms).
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H3: Risk seeking will be observed whenever a) the share price is short of some reference 
point or aspiration level4; b) subjects exhibit strong probability weighting, such that the 
generally smaller probabilities of winning in the HV investment are overweighted; and c) 
subjects are relatively low in loss aversion;
We now move to the conceptually more interesting case of stock-option compensation. Because of 
reference dependence, we now need to explicitly take into account the asset position of the CEO. 
We thus start by looking at the problem in period zero or whenever all previously emitted stock-
options have been sold, when a CEO holds only stock-options which are at-the-money. A CEO will 
now choose the HV investment over the LV investment if and only if
w+(pHV)*U(αHV*yi) > w+(pLV)*U(αLV*yi) (3)
This derives from the fact that while any increase in stock value can be cashed in, decreases in share 
value do not result in monetary losses since options need not be exercised. Although there may still  
be a loss in future earning potential given a stronger decrease in share price from a HV investment, 
this effect is likely to be secondary and the attention will be mostly focused on the gain side of the 
prospects. This means that the HV prospect will be chosen more often than in the situation depicted 
in equation 2. Moreover, choices of the HV investment will be reinforced by commonly found 
overweighting of small probabilities (Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996), given that the 
probability of a success is generally lower in the HV investment than in the LV investment.
Let us now take the case in which in addition to the options just emitted, the CEO holds one 
additional option bundle which is either in-the-money or out-of-the-money. Since one of the option 
bundles (the one just emitted) will always be at-the-money, equation 3 will still be relevant for the  
decision. In addition, however, for options that are in-the-money there is now the consideration that 
any currently existing value of the other option bundle, yi-et, may be lost (either completely or in 
part, depending on the value of βHV). Loss aversion over accumulated value will thus work against 
the risk-seeking tendency produced by newly emitted options. If on the other hand the additional 
option bundle is out-of-the-money, this will create additional incentives for risk seeking in order to 
push the share price above the exercising value of the out-of-the-money options. The exercise price 
of that bundle will thus act as an aspiration level (Carpenter, 2000; Diecidue & van de Ven, 2008). 
This risk-seeking tendency is further reinforced by the fact that no losses can be felt for options that 
are at- or out-of-the-money, so that loss aversion will not play a role for the decision. This intuition 
4 A discussion of what reference point may be appropriate will be provided in the results section below.
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leads us to the formulation of the following hypothesis:
H4: Under stock-option compensation, executives will display a propensity for taking risks 
that are suboptimal for shareholders since they are sheltered from losses and look mainly at 
the gain part; a) the extent of this risk taking will depend on the options held at the time of the 
decision so that the higher the value Σt(yi-et) of options held, the less likely subjects will be to 
choose the HV investment; more precisely b) subjects will be particularly risk seeking if all 
the options held at the moment of the decision are out-of-the-money; and c) subjects will be 
more averse to risks if all options currently held are in-the-money; also d) other things being 
equal, subjects who tend to overweight small probabilities will take more risks; and finally, e) 
the more loss averse subjects are, the sooner they will exercise their options. 
4.2 Risk attitudes: overview
We used the method of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & L'Haridon (2008), altering it only sightly to speed 
up the process (see instructions in appendix D), to elicit detailed risk attitudes. We elicited six 
certainty equivalents for pure gain prospects, six for pure loss prospects, and one for a mixed 
prospect. This allows us to derive utility functions over relevant amounts, which together with the 
estimation of probability weighting functions for gains and losses allow for the precise estimation of 
loss aversion (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv, 2007; Schmidt & Zank, 2005). This was done 
before any treatment manipulations were introduced, so that the elicitation procedure was the same 
for all subjects. While one choice was selected for real pay in each domain (gains, losses, and mixed 
gambles), no information on payoffs was given until the very end of the experiment to avoid 
income effects. This part of the experiment lasted approximately 20 minutes.
Table 2 : Classification of subjects in terms of risk attitude 
LOSSES
Risk averse Risk seeking Mixed Total
Risk averse 18 24 10 52
GAINS Risk seeking 5 15 6 26
Mixed 4 10 4 18
Total 27 49 20 96
Following Abdellaoui et al. (2008), we classified a subject as risk averse (seeking) within each 
domain, if  she was risk averse (seeking) for at least 4 out of 6 prospects in said domain. If a subject 
had exactly three risk averse and three risk seeking answers in one domain, then she was classified 
in the mixed category. As can be seen from table 2, most of our 96 experimental subjects cannot be 
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classified as universally risk averse or risk seeking. Indeed, only 18 out of 96 subjects (19%) 
conform to the traditional assumption of global risk aversion! The majority pattern is one of risk 
aversion for gains (54%) and risk seeking for losses (51%), and the combination of the two is also 
the modal pattern at the individual level. The average loss aversion coefficient was 1.94. 
Beyond the general overview provided above, we can take a closer look at probability 
weighting and utility functions, both at the aggregate and at the individual level. Figure 5a and 5b 
represent the average probability weighting function and utility function respectively. We find the 
typical patterns predicted by prospect theory, with overweighting of small probabilities,  
underweighting of large probabilities, concave utility for gains and convex utility for losses, as well 
as loss aversion. Estimating the simple parametric functions introduced by Tversky & Kahnemann 
(1992), we find that utility for gains is indeed significantly different from linearity and concave (z = 
–8.697, p=0.000; one-sample median test), and utility for losses significantly different from 
linearity and convex (z = –10.009, p=0.000). Also, probability weighting is significantly different 
from linearity for both gains (z=10.800, p=0.000) and losses (z=10.773, p=0.000).
Fig. 5a: Average probability weighting function for 
gains (similar for losses)
Fig. 5b: Average utility function
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More interesting in the present context are however representations at the individual level. Figure 6 
shows some typical non-parametric probability weighting functions at the individual level for gains 
(typical functions for losses are similar). Subject number 50 can be seen to have (approximately) 
linear probability weighting. Subjects 85 is optimistic, overweighting probabilities throughout,  
whereas subject 62 is pessimistic, underweighting probabilities throughout. Subject 10 on the other 
hand displays the typical inverse-S pattern that is found to be prevalent at the aggregate level:  
overweighting of small probabilities, probabilistic insensitivity for the medium range, and hence 
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w(p)
p
underweighting of medium to large probabilities. For a more thorough discussion of such attitudes 
at the individual level and how to classify them, see Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, & Wakker (2010).
 
Fig. 6: typical probability weighting functions at the individual level, non-parametric
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4.3 Regression analysis of risk attitudes
We have now seen that risk attitudes in our sample are typically not well described by expected 
utility theory, and tend to rather follow the pattern predicted by prospect theory. At this point it  
remains to be seen whether the individual risk parameters help predicting choices between the 
investments in the main task according to the hypotheses derived above. In order to test hypothesis 
3, we look at some possible reference points, loss aversion, and at the overweighting of small 
probabilities and the underweighting of large probabilities.
Table 3 shows the results of a random effects Probit regression for the stock ownership 
condition. As already anticipated above, differences in expected value play an important role, with 
choices of the HV investment diminishing as said difference increases. We next look at potential 
reference points. One problem with reference points is that the true reference points of subjects are 
generally unknown, which holds especially true in a dynamic environment such as this one. We 
follow Baucells, Weber, & Welfens (2011) in assuming that a combination of past values may act as 
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such a reference point. Since we cannot directly estimate the reference point as they do, we use a 
simple average of past stock prices. The effect of that reference point can be seen to be highly 
significant in the regression. Indeed, if the share price plunges below the past average price, risk 
seeking increases markedly. This confirms our hypothesis 3a. 
Table 3: Risk attitudes in the stock-ownership condition (random-effect probit model)
Dep. Variable: choice of the risky 
investment (1)
(2)
Difference in expected value –0.370**(0.169)
–0.408**
(0.169)
Stock value 0.178(0.227)
0.155
(0.221)
Stock below the past average 0.443***(0.143)
0.452***
(0.142)
Overweighting of small 
probabilities (CE/EV|p=0.1)
0.598***
(0.155)
Underweighting of large 
probabilities (1–CE/EV|p=0.7)
–0.292
(0.270)
Loss aversion 0.007(0.032)
Constant 0.643(0.583)
0.877
(0.542)
Nb observations 672 (48 subjects) 672 (48 subjects)
LL –389 –381
Note: All specifications include period effects and control for gender, age and field of study.*** significant at the 1% 
level; ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Obviously, such a linear combination of past prices is not the only conceivable reference point.  
Current share price per se can be seen from the regression not to play a role. We have entered no 
further reference points in the regression because of multi-collinearity issues with the average 
reported. If instead of the average level we use other salient reference points, we also find strong 
effects, with risk seeking increasing markedly for instance when the price plunges below the 
minimum price observed in the past (p<0.01) or below the best performance in the past (p<0.10). 
Figure 7 represents the effect of these reference points graphically. It directly compares the level of 
risk taking when current share prices are below the different reference points to the level of risk 
seeking observed when the share prices lie above those same reference points. The differences are 
indeed remarkable, showing that the reference points play an important part in explaining choice 
behavior.
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Figure 7: Percentage of risky choices by reference point, stock compensation
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Beyond and in addition to reference points, we hypothesized that probability weighting and loss 
aversion may also influence choices. From specification 2 of the regression we can see that subjects 
who overweigh small probabilities do indeed take the HV investment significantly more often. This  
confirms our hypothesis 3b. Finally, loss aversion does not explain a significant proportion of 
variance, so that there is no support in the data for hypothesis 3c.
Fig. 8: percentage of risky choices conditional on asset situation, option compensation
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We next take a closer look at hypothesis 4. Figure 8 displays levels of choices of the HV investment 
in the option treatment separated by asset position. The basic level of risk taking when all options 
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are at-the-money is relatively high at 42%, which is similar to the level of risk taking observed 
when executives hold a mixed bundle containing both options that are in- and out-of-the-money. 
Choices of the HV investment are reduced to 29% when CEOs hold options that are in-the-money. 
When all the options held are out-of-the-money, however, subjects choose the HV investment fully 
72% of the time.
Table 4: Risk attitudes in the stock-options condition (random-effect Probit model)
Dep. Variable: choice of the 
risky investment (1) (2) (3)
Difference in expected value –0.197(0.165)
–0.199
(0.165)
–0.215
(0.168)
Stock value 0.331(0.245)
0.321
(0.244)
0.390 
(0.272)
Total value of options held –0.197***(0.066)
–0.197***
(0.066)
–0.032
(0.069)
All options in-the-money –0.454***(0.174)
All options out-the-money 0.718***(0.153)
All options at-the-money –0.416(0.255)
Overweighting of small 
probabilities (CE/EV|p=0.1)
0.173
(0.171)
0.129
(0.172)
Underweighting of large 
probabilities (1–CE/EV|p=0.7)
0.098
(0.318)
0.181
(0.321)
Nb observations 672 (48 subjects) 672 (48 subjects) 672 (48 subjects)
LL –405 –405 –381
Note: All specifications inculde period effects and control for gender, age and field of study.*** significant at the 1% 
level; ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4 tests hypothesis 4 statistically through a random effects Probit regression. The difference in 
expected value between the HV and the LV investment now plays no role in explaining choices. It  
further clearly emerges that risk taking decreases in the total value of options held, thus confirming 
our hypothesis 4a. To test our hypotheses 4b and 4c, we need to disentangle the options held by the 
CEO. Regression (3) thus introduces three dummies indicating that all options held (except the 
bundle just emitted, which is always at-the-money by definition) are in-, at-, or out-of-the-money, 
with the effect being measured against the forth possible case in which the CEO holds a mix of 
options, some of which are in- and some out-of-the-money. Holding only options that are in-the-
money significantly reduces risk taking. When on the other hand all options held are out-of-the-
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money, risk taking increases dramatically. This confirms hypotheses 4c and 4b respectively.
This leaves us with probability weighting to be examined. In the regressions reported in 
table 4 probability weighting is not significant. That is however somewhat misleading, since we 
have seen above that we would expect it to be important only in cases where all options are at the 
money, and may expect it to be overwhelmed by reference dependence under different asset 
positions. When options holdings are either mixed or purely at the money, overweighing of small 
probabilities indeed increases risk taking as predicted (p<0.1). In that case, the underweighting of 
large probabilities is also marginally significant (p<0.1), and negative as predicted.
We next take a look at executives' option selling behavior in order to test hypothesis 4e. 
Table 5 presents a Probit analysis regressing option selling decisions on a number of potential 
explanatory variables. We take as dependent variable the selling decision (1 if sold, 0 if kept) for 
each bundle of five options. Option bundles are thus followed from their emission period through 
the selling period, and may be included in the regression between 1 and 15 times, depending on 
when they are emitted and when they are sold. This results in a total of 3275 observations. 
Table 5: Decisions to exercise options
Dep. Var: exercising option (1) (2)
Loss aversion 0.346***(0.029)
Potential gain from selling 0.171***(0.033)
0.149***
(0.034)
Nb options held 0.434***(0.027)
0.205***
(0.009)
Nb options sold 0.687***(0.040)
0.337***
(0.013)
Cumulated gains –0.087***(0.033)
–0.102***
(0.014)
Peak price 1.377***(0.219)
1.253***
(0.154)
Stock value (t-1) 1.174***(0.652)
0.698***
(0.294)
Constant –36.561***(4.391)
–18.193*
(1.712)
Nb observations 3275 3275
LL –650 –701
Note: The dependent variable is the decision to exercise options or not. *** significant at the 1% level; ** at the 5% 
level and * at the 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include period effects and control for  
gender, age and field of study.
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From a normative point of view, people should not exercise options before they expire because the 
market value of a “live” option exceeds the proceeds from exercise (Heath, Huddart, & Lang, 
1999). We find that subjects sell their options on average after holding them for three periods. The 
main reason for selling stock options are liquidity considerations, which do obviously not apply in 
our experiment. In addition, stock-options provide subjects with a sure amount in the current period 
and an uncertain amount of cash in the future. Subjects may thus sell their options too early if they 
are loss averse, thus exhibiting a sort of myopic loss aversion (Fellner & Sutter, 2009; Gneezy & 
Potters, 1997). We find a highly significant effect of loss aversion. Loss averse individuals are much 
more likely to sell their stock in any given period, thus foregoing potential future gains due to their  
fear of losing already available gains. This confirms our hypothesis 4e. 
Reassuringly, the potential gain that can be realized by selling a package of options 
influences decisions. This goes to show that the overall majority of subjects understood the payoff 
mechanism quite well. Quite naturally, holding a larger amount of options makes selling them more 
likely. Furthermore, the number of options already sold also makes it more likely that options will  
be sold in any given period. The latter finding could be due to several factors, including a general 
positive trend in stock-price, a different investment strategy, or the perpetuation of an initial selling  
strategy (e.g. 'sell as soon as a positive gain can be realized').
We also find an income effect for selling (exercising) decisions. Indeed, a higher 
accumulated income makes it less likely that options are sold in any given period, indicating a 
higher acceptance of the risk deriving from keeping the options longer-term. This agrees with 
general findings on income effects in the literature (Lee, 2008; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). We also 
find a highly significant peak price effect, i.e. subjects are much more likely to sell their options 
when the current share price is above the highest price observed in the past. This finding is in line 
with past studies on option exercising decision (Core & Guay, 2001; Heath, Huddart, & Lang, 
1999). It has been explained by the fact that, when the share price reaches its peak, it is 
automatically above the reference point for all individuals when reference points are formed as 
some kind of combination of past share prices (Baucells, Weber, & Welfens, 2011).
 
5. Discussion
We find that compensating executives trough options induces risk taking by executives not only 
when such risk taking is optimal for shareholders or the company, but also when such risk-taking is 
sub-optimal. While paying executives in restricted company stock reduces such risk seeking, the 
level of risk seeking that remains is still very high. 
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The results that significant risk seeking remains even when subjects are compensated 
through long-term stock ownership plans rather than stock options with short vesting periods is 
indeed surprising. Linear compensation mechanisms have generally been assumed to result in 
excessive risk aversion, and traditional models based on expected value or expected utility 
maximization cannot account for these data. On the other hand, we have shown that a prospect-
theory-based model explains such choices quite well. Once one takes into account probability 
weighting and reference points, one can thus explain why there is remaining risk seeking when 
executives are compensated through stock, as well as being able to predict under what conditions 
executives compensated through options will be particularly risk-prone.
A bit less surprising, though still important, is the finding that risk taking under 
compensation though options takes place even when such risk taking is excessive for the 
shareholders and the company. This finding is indeed driven by two main factors. On the one hand, 
reference points as described by current asset holdings strongly influence choice behavior, thus 
inducing risk taking beyond the levels predicted purely by the non-linearity of the incentive 
instrument. This is nicely shown in our model and later confirmed in the data. On the other hand, 
we have also seen that differences in expected value do not influence choices under option 
compensation, thus extending the generality of earlier findings. Obviously, this is also a matter of 
degree: expected values in our setup are always non-negative, so that extreme cases are excluded. It 
seems rather clear that by making the HV investment extremely negative in terms of expected value  
will eventually lead to zero choices of that investment—no matter how high its volatility.
One important criticism that could be brought to our result is that by using relatively low 
stakes it underestimates risk aversion. We have seen that in our data risk attitude is mostly driven by 
probability weighting and loss aversion while utility for gains was found to be only slightly 
concave. Given that under prospect theory risk attitudes are determined by a combination of these 
three elements, a more extreme shape of the utility function may well counteract the probability  
weighting we have found to drive results. Notice, however, how the convex utility function in the 
loss domain may actually increase risk seeking when decisions take place in the loss domain. When 
decisions take place in the gain domain, a more concave utility function as typically found for  
higher stakes may well increase risk aversion. Taken together, however, this does not show a clear 
direction in which decision making might change. Existing studies from the management literature 
do indeed indicate that the typical pattern of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory persist for 
large-scale decisions (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Jegers, 1991).
The nature of the compensation scheme is not the only difference between our option and 
stock-ownership treatments. One characteristic of the stock-ownership plan that seems rather 
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fundamental is the long-term nature of the stock compensation, which is contrasted to the short-
term structure of option compensation. In reality, stock-ownership often provides short-term 
incentives as well, and may in such a case produce investment behavior that is closer to the one 
observed for options (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Spamann, 2009). Given the main purpose of our study—
testing whether the prediction of zero risk tolerance under linear compensation contracts stands the 
empirical test—a longer time horizon such as the one implemented in our experiment does indeed 
constitute a stronger test. Any excessive risk taking that we have found can thus be expected to 
increase under shorter-term compensation structures.
There is however also an opposite case to be made—that increasing the vesting periods of 
options may reduce risk taking. This however may or may not be true. The evidence from our 
experiment points in the direction that risk taking under option compensation strongly depends on 
asset positions. This in turn indicates that risk taking under longer vesting periods may well 
decrease as long as any options held are in-the-money. If on the other hand they should be out-of-
the-money after a decrease in stock prices, longer vesting periods may increase risk seeking even 
when such risk seeking is sub-optimal for the company and shareholders. The exact effect will thus 
depend on the specific circumstance and is ultimately an empirical question.
At this point, we also need to address potential subject pool effects. We have already seen in 
the results section how economic and business students seem to take more rational decisions than 
others. This may well derive from their better understanding of the issues at hand. It is however 
often alleged that using students as experimental subjects may reduce the external validity of any 
results obtained. The fact that the overwhelming proportion of our subjects are economic and 
business students from French elite schools—and that future CEOs can be expected to be drawn 
from that pool to a large extent—seems to reduce such concerns. Furthermore, alleged subject pool 
effects need not always go in the expected direction. For instance, Haigh & List (2005) found that 
myopic loss aversion is actually accentuated by using professional traders instead of students in an 
experiment—the opposite of what the authors had expected. One could thus argue that having more 
experience with the kind of decisions subjects are called upon to take in our experiment may if 
anything accentuate their tendency to increase their own profits, even if this works to the detriment 
of shareholders.
6. Conclusion
Traditional theories propose to link pay to performance by compensating executives through 
options rather than company shares, in order to avoid the excessive risk aversion triggered by linear 
incentive contracts. We found that not only do executives take risks that are excessive from 
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shareholders' point of view when compensated through stock-options, but they do so even when 
compensated through restricted company stock, even though to a lesser degree. This is explained 
through a model that abandons the classical agency theory assumption of global risk aversion in 
favor of a richer, behaviorally founded, model of risk attitudes. Taking into account asset positions 
as well as compensation mechanisms, we find that risk-taking is strongly influenced by reference 
points, non-linear probability weighting, and loss aversion. It thus seems at the time to incorporate 
such richer risk attitudes into incentive theory in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
incentive effects of different contract provisions. 
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Appendix A: Decision Screens, Main Experiment
i) Investment screen
ii) feedback screen
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iii) option selling decision (option compensation only)
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Appendix B: Instructions main experiment (option payment)
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to take repeated decisions over 15 rounds. You have 
two roles in this part, one as CEO of a company, and one as stockholder in 5 other companies 
managed by five other people in your group. Groups are randomly formed at the beginning of part 2 
and stay the same for all 15 rounds. Just as you are a shareholder in the 5 companies managed by 
the other 5 people in your group, the other 5 people in your group are shareholders in your company 
and part of their payoff thus depends on your company's performance. 
Please notice that your decisions are completely anonymous, and that neither the experimenter nor 
any of the shareholders in your company (the other 5 people in your group) can trace any decisions 
or outcomes back to you. As a matter of fact, neither you nor the other people taking part in the 
experiment will know who of the others in the experiment was in their group of 6.
In your function as CEO, you are managing a company. Your company has an initial value of 100 
euros, corresponding to 100 shares of the value of 1 euro each. Your main decision will be to choose 
in each period which of two investment projects you want to invest the assets of your company 
in: investment A or investment B. You will have to make a choice between these two options, and 
you have to invest the total value of your company in every period. Each investment will be 
described for each period, and is characterized by its outcomes and its probabilities. Outcomes are 
given in percentage changes of company value, which can be either positive, negative or zero.
Example:
A typical choice is shown in the screen below. In the example shown, you are called upon to decide 
between two investments for your company assets:
- investment A, which gives you a 50% chance that the company assets will increase by 8% and a 
50% chance that they will decrease by 4%
- investment B, which gives you a 20% chance that the company assets will increase by 40%, and 
an 80% chance that the value of your company assets will decrease by 8%
Imagine that you are facing the first investment decision (period 1), and that the company you 
manage is thus worth 100 euros. Imagine now you choose investment A and your investment is 
successful. Your company is now worth 108 euros, which corresponds to a value of 1.08 euros per 
share. This will be your starting value for period 2. There are 15 periods of investment in total.
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Payoffs:
Contrary to part 1, all your decisions will now count towards your final payoff. Your payoffs are 
determined as follows. Before each investment period, you will obtain 5 stock options that give 
you the right to buy company stock in any future period for the exercise price indicated on the 
option. Options will be emitted at company value and will become vested (that is, cashable) in the 
subsequent period. You can then decide separately for options obtained in different periods whether 
you want to: 1) cash the options, thus obtaining the difference between the current stock price and 
the emission value of the option (times 5 since you have five options); or 2) keep the options and 
preserve the right to exercise them in a later period.
Example (continued):
Following the example given above, this means that before your first investment decision you have 
obtained 5 stock options with an exercise price of 1 euro each (the company value divided by 100). 
Imagine again that you chose option A and that your investment was successful, so that your share 
value increased to 1.08 euros per share. You will now be asked whether you want to sell your 
options (actually: buy company stock and resell the stock, but the decision is only one and 
incorporates the two steps) or whether you want to keep the options.
If you decide to sell your options, in the example above you now gain 0.08 euros (8cents) on each 
of them for a total of 40 cents (the current stock value minus the exercise price for the five shares 
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you can buy). If you decide to keep them, you obtain no money but preserve the right to sell them at 
a later point. Whatever your decision, at this point 5 new options will be emitted at an emission 
value of 1.08 euros each and you will start round 2. Once again, you will choose an investment, 
become feedback on whether the investment was successful or not, and you will again be asked 
whether you want to exercise your stock options. In case you have not yet sold your period 1 
options, you will now be asked separately whether you want to sell your period 1 options and 
whether you want to sell your period 2 options.
Your Role as Shareholder:
In addition to your role as CEO, you are also a shareholder in the 5 companies managed by the 
other 5 people in your group (just as those other 5 people are shareholders in your company). This 
is a passive role, inasmuch as it does not require you to take any decisions. However, the shares you 
hold in the other companies will contribute towards your final payoffs as follows. In each of the 5 
companies, you initially hold one share worth 1 euro. At the end of the 15 rounds, you will be paid 
out the total value of the shares you own in the different companies. For instance, if the final value 
of company 4 is 103 euros and the final value of company 6 is 187 euros, you will obtain 1.03 euros 
from your share in company 4, and 1.87 euros from the share you own in company 6 (plus whatever 
your shares in the other 3 companies are worth).
Typical Properties of Investments:
Finally we include a graphical display of the typical properties of investments A and B, derived 
from a simulation of investments with very similar characteristics. Please notice that the changes  
displayed in the graphs below are not the ones that will obtain in the experiment, but that they 
represent only random realizations from the same type of investment that have obtained in the past.  
However, the general trends that are indicated reflect the two types of investment that you will face.  
This means that the graphical display should not be seen as a substitute for careful considerations of 
probabilities and outcomes, but only as an indication of the general average characteristics of 
the different investment types.
Graph 1 below displays the evolution of typical investments A and B in 15 periods in the past (thick 
solid lines, with the light line representing investment A and the dark line representing investment  
B). Graph 1 also shows the long-term average returns of the two investment types (thin dashed 
lines, with the light line representing investment A and the dark line representing investment B).  
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Those average returns are what results from observing investment types A and B over thousands of 
trials and averaging the outcomes.
Graph 2 shows the same data in a different way. While graph 1 shows the evolution of company 
stock as you will also see it during the experiment, graph 2 shows absolute percentage changes on 
the previous period (not taking base values into account). The data are the same as in graph 1, but 
they are displayed in a different way to show changes period per period.
Graph 1: Solid lines indicate the evolution of investments A and B over 15 periods in the past; the dashed lines indicate 
long-time trends of the two investment types; light grey lines indicate investment type A, dark grey lines investment 
type B.
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Appendix C: Investment Pairs
HV prospect LV prospect
Prob. (loss, gain) % change Prob.(loss, gain) % change 
Pair 1 (0.8, 0.2) (-8, 40) (0.5, 0.5) (-4, 8)
Pair 2 (0.6, 0.4) (-4, 10) (0.3, 0.7) (-2, 4)
Pair 3 (0.6, 0.4) (-6 ,9) (0.6, 0.4) (-1, 7)
Pair 4 (0.9, 0.1) (-2, 22) (0.2, 0.8) (-2, 4)
Pair 5 (0.5, 0.5) (-8, 12) (0.3, 0.7) (-4, 5)
Pair 6 (0.6, 0.4) (-12 ,19) (0.5, 0.5) (-2, 8)
Pair 7 (0.4, 0.6) (-15 ,12) (0.5, 0.5) (-2, 6)
Pair 8 (0.8, 0.2) (-6, 34) (0.2, 0.8) (-6, 6)
Pair 9 (0.7, 0.3) (-10 ,26) (0.7, 0.3) (-0, 6)
Pair 10 (0.5, 0.5) (-8, 13) (0.4, 0.6) (-5, 8)
Pair 11 (0.7, 0.3) (-9, 20) (0.5, 0.5) (-2, 5)
Pair 12 (0.9, 0.1) (-8, 60) (0.6, 0.4) (-0, 4)
Pair 13 (0.8, 0.2) (-7, 30) (0.3, 0.7) (-3, 5)
Pair 14 (0.6, 0.4) (-10, 16) (0.6, 0.4) (-5, 12)
Pair 15 (0.9, 0.1) (-8,  70) (0.8, 0.2) (0, 7)
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Appendix D: Instructions Risk Elicitation
Part 1 of the experiment consists in choices between lotteries. All the choices you make are 
completely confidential and cannot be traced back to you personally. Please consider each decision 
problem carefully before you indicate your decision, as your final payoff will depend on your 
choices in addition to chance.
In the choice pairs involved in part 1, you will be called upon to make repeated choices between a 
sure amount of money and a lottery with two outcomes. As to the outcomes of the lottery, there are 
three basic types of lotteries: 1) lotteries giving you a certain probability to win an amount of 
money, and a complementary probability of winning nothing (pure gain lottery); 2) lotteries giving 
you a certain probability to lose an amount of money, and a complementary probability of losing 
nothing (pure loss lottery); and 3) lotteries giving you a probability of winning a certain amount of 
money and a complementary probability of losing a certain amount of money (mixed lottery). All 
the information necessary for you to take a decision will be displayed on the  computer screen.
Given this setup of the lotteries, and given that the parameters of a decision change for each 
decision problem that is presented to you, it is crucial that you pay close attention to both 
outcomes and probabilities. Also, pay attention to the sign of the outcome as it may be positive or 
negative! While you can incur losses in this part of the experiment, the payoffs are calibrated in 
such a way that it is extremely unlikely for you to lose money over the course of the whole 
experiment.
For pure gain or pure loss lotteries, you will be asked to choose repeatedly between any given 
lottery and different certain amounts. According to your choices, the certain amount will be adjusted 
upwards or downwards for the subsequent decision. You will then be asked again to choose between 
the new certain amount and the lottery. After five choices, you will pass on to the next lottery.
For mixed lotteries, a procedure analogous to the one described above is used. The only difference 
is that for these lotteries what changes in subsequent iterations is not the sure amount of money 
(which now stays always at 0), but rather the amount to be lost in the lottery. Below you find an 
example of a choice for a pure gain lottery and for a mixed lottery. 
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We next describe how your payoffs for this part of the experiment will be determined. Only some of 
the choices you make will be randomly drawn and played for real money. While the exact procedure 
is described in detail below, the most important thing for you to know is that you will perform best 
if you make each decision as if it were the only one to be played for real. In other words, there 
does not exist any way in which you can outsmart the system by choosing according to some 
predetermined strategy.
Three choices will be extracted for real play from the lotteries presented to you in part 1—one 
choice involving a pure gain lottery, one choice involving a mixed lottery, and one choice involving 
a pure loss lottery. All choices within the given domain have the same probability of being 
extracted.
Whatever choices are extracted will then be played out at the end of the experiment. If in the choice  
that is extracted you have chosen the sure amount, that amount will be added to (or subtracted from 
for loss lotteries) your total payoff. If you have chosen the lottery, a random draw will determine 
whether you have won or lost, and the corresponding amount will be added or subtracted from your 
total payoffs.
The payoff will only be determined once the whole experiment is finished. When you are done with 
the questions in part 1, please wait for the other people in the experiment to finish as well. As soon 
as everybody has completed the first part, we will proceed to distributing the instructions for part 2.
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